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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

;

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

3

VENUS ANN SHERARD,

t

Case No. 890383-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Petitioner. :
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
1.

Has defendant asserted a proper basis for

2.

Did this Court properly determine that defendant

rehearing?

had failed to preserve for appeal the issue of the sufficiency of
the jury voir dire as it related to the prospective jurors'
knowledge of Ruby Kelly's family?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Venus Sherard, was charged on May 7, 1987,
with murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (1990) (R. 3, 15-16).
Defendant violated the terms of her pretrial release and she was
re-arrested in September, 1988 (R. 63-64, 71, 74).
Prior to the original trial date in 1987, defendant
moved to individually voir dire the prospective jurors. The
motion was denied "without prejudice" (R. 22; Supplemental Record
272 at 19). The motion was never renewed.
In 1989, defendant filed pretrial written requests for

proposed voir dire questions (R. 97-103, 160-61).

During trial,

the court conducted the voir dire of the jury panel in open court
and individually questioned some prospective jurors in chambers
(T. 3-68).

At the conclusion of the voir dire, defendant passed

the jurors for cause (T. 67).
The trial resulted in a jury verdict against defendant
as charged (R. 245). Defendant was sentenced to the statutory
term and timely appealed (R. 252, 254).
On appeal, this Court affirmed defendant's conviction.
State v. Sherard, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. 50 (Utah App. Sept. 10,
1991).

Defendant petitioned for a rehearing and this Court

requested that the state file a response addressing only Point II
of the petition, defined by defendant as:
This Court should apply criminal standards in
completely assessing the preservation of the
voir dire issue concerning Ruby Kelly's
family members.
(Petition for Rehearing at 4).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Court accurately stated the facts of this case in
its opinion.

Sherard, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. at 50-52.

However, the

following facts are relevant tc the voir dire issue now raised.
As set forth in appellee's original brief at 19-23, the
trial court conducted an extensive voir dire of the jury.

The

court asked questions concerning areas of inquiry requested by
defendant as well as posing other questions sua sponte

(T. 3-68).

Specifically, as it relates to the petition for
rehearing, defendant submitted a pretrial amended written request
-2-

for the following questions to be asked of the jury panel:
1. Do any of you know the defendant VENUS
SHERARD, her family, or Ruby Kelly's family?
2. Do any of you know of the defendant,
VENUS SHERARD, her family or Ruby Kelly's
family through your family or friends?
(R. 160) (emphasis in original).1

In response, the court asked

counsel to introduce themselves, defendant, and their respective
witnesses (T. 16-17).

The witnesses, pertinent to this petition,

included Vikki Salazar, the victim's cousin (T. 18-19, 455),
Vikki's brother, Jeff Salazar, presumptively a cousin to the
victim (T. 16-18, 283), and Vikki's nephew, Todd Kingston,
presumptively a second cousin to the victim (T. 16-18, 339). The
court asked if any of the prospective jurors were "acquainted"
with these witnesses (T. 17). None of the jurors indicated that
they were (T. 19). Subsequently, the prospective jurors were
asked if they were "familiar" with the victim, Ruby Kelly.

All

responded negatively (T. 21).
After the in-court voir dire was completed, the court
proceeded with an in-chambers inquiry of some of the panel
members.

At this point, one of the prospective jurors, Manuel

1

On appeal, defendant characterized these proposed questions
as "concerning the relationships or contact between prospective
jurors and Ruby Kelly's family" (Br. of Appellant at 19). The
State responded that the requested questions concerned the
"prospective jurors' acquaintance with or knowledge of" the victim
and her relatives (Br. of Appellee at 23).
This Court adopted defendant's characterization. Sherard.
169 Utah Adv. Rep. at 52. Since it is undisputed that the written
submissions constitute the totality of defendant's request, a more
accurate description of the requests is that they inquired into the
prospective juror's knowledge of the victim or her relatives.

•3-

Martinez, who had previously responded that he was neither
acquainted or familiar with Vikki Salazar or Ruby Kelly, asked to
speak to the court because he thought he "may be familiar with
some of the parties in this case" (T. 58). In-chambers, Mr.
Martinez admitted that he was "real good friends" with Anthony
and Max Kelly, two of Ruby's brothers, and that his wife's
sister-in-law was Vikki Salazar (T. 58-59).

The court removed

the juror for cause (T. 62, 64-65).
During the voir dire, the court asked counsel if there
were any additional inquiries requested.

In apparent response to

an unrecorded bench conference with counsel, the court asked
additional questions concerning sources of news information, the
prospective jurors' areas of study or work, any physical
difficulties which the jurors might have, and any other
difficulties which the jurors might have dependent upon the
length of trial (T. 41-49).

Subsequently, the court convened in-

chambers to continue the individual voir dire of some of the
jurors (T. 49). After this questioning was completed, the court
again asked counsel if they had any further questions for the
jury panel (T. 65). Defense counsel responded by requesting
inquiries into the areas of the prospective juror's club and
organization affiliations, hobbies, leisure activities, reading
materials, length of time outside Salt Lake City, involvement in
fist fights, and consumption of alcohol (T. 65-66).

After

counsel stated these specific requests, the court again asked if
there was "anything else," and defense counsel responded "no" (T.

-4-

66-67).

Returning to open court, defendant passed the panel for

cause (T. 67).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Where the issue raised by a petition for rehearing has
been fully briefed and litigated by the parties, rehearing of the
same issue is improper.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure require a party to raise an objection to voir
dire at the trial level or be precluded from raising the issue on
appeal.

Therefore, this Court properly concluded that defendant

had failed to preserve for appellant review any argument about
the scope of the voir dire questioning of the prospective jurors'
knowledge of Ruby's Kelly's relatives.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN A PETITION FOR REHEARING, IT IS IMPROPER
TO RAISE ISSUES WHICH HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY
BRIEFED AND ARGUED.
Consistently, Utah has followed the recognized
proposition that a petition for rehearing should only be granted
where the appellate court has misconstrued or overlooked a
material question of fact or controlling case law.

Cumminas v.

Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P. 619, 624 (1913); Brown v.
Pickard, 4 Utah 292, 11 P. 512 (1886).
Despite these limitations, defendant asserts that
rehearing should be granted because this Court rejected her
claim that a failure to object to the adequacy of the voir dire
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in a criminal case does not preclude appellate review.
Defendant's argument, both originally and in her petitionf is
essentially two-pronged, that is: (1) the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure do not require a defendant to timely object to any
omissions or errors in court-conducted voir dire in criminal
cases, and (2) even if an objection was required, the alleged
error here should be reviewed under the "plain error" doctrine.
Consistent with this Court's directive to respond to
the petition, the merits of defendant's argument will be
discussed in Point II of this response.

However, apart from the

merits, defendant's petition for rehearing is improper in that it
raises no issue which was not fully briefed and argued by the
parties.

Accord Fuller v. Johnson, 784 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ark.

1990) (repetition of an original argument on appeal is an
inappropriate subject for a petition for rehearing); Taylor v.
Johnson. 581 So.2d 1333, 1338 (Fla. App. 1990) (reargument cf
matters raised in the original briefs does not constitute a basis
for rehearing).
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court had
erroneously failed to ask "requested questions concerning the
relationships or contact between prospective jurors and Ruby
Kelly's family" (Br. of Appellant at 19-24).

Specifically,

defendant argued that despite defendant's trial counsel's failure
to object to the adequacy of the voir dire concerning Kelly's
relatives, this Court should review the issue as the "need" for
the questions "was obvious" and the "plain error" doctrine

-6-

permitted it (Br. of Appellant at 23). As further support for
appellate review, defendant asserted that the waiver doctrine of
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456 (Utah App.), cert, granted, 789 P.2d
33 (Utah 1989), was inapplicable to the issue of jury selection
in a criminal case (Br. of Appellant at 22 n.22).
The state responded in its brief that defendant had
failed to comply with rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
in preserving any objection, and that the plain error doctrine
was inappropriate under the facts of this case (Br. of Appellee
at 23-25).
In her reply brief, defendant responded that rule 18,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governing jury selection in
criminal trials, imposes a different responsibility on the trial
court in conducting voir dire than does rule 47, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, governing voir dire in civil cases (Reply Brief
at 2-6). (See Addendum for complete text of all procedural rules
cited.)

In opposition to the state's waiver argument, defendant

claimed that the written pretrial request for the questions
combined with a general reference to the request was sufficient
to preserve the issue (Reply Brief at 4). 2 Alternatively,

2

Defendant has consistently asserted that her trial counsel
made a general objection to any questions submitted but not asked.
This is incorrect. Defense counsel first stated that she generally
excepted to any questions submitted but not asked (T. 65). The
trial court responded, "All right. Then state the questions that
you felt the court should have gone into in more detail" (T. 65).
Counsel then listed her specific objections in other areas but did
not refer to any question concerning Kelly's relatives. When asked
again if she had any further objections, defense counsel stated
M
noM (T. 65-67).
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defendant argued that once the trial court elected to conduct the
voir dire, the court assumed the complete burden of its adequacy
and thus no objects were required of counsel (Reply Brief at 36).
At oral argument, these issues were fully discussed.
Thereafter, this Court concluded that, under the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure and the cases cited by the parties, a
defendant is required to object to the adequacy of voir dire
conducted in a criminal trial.
52.

Sherard, 169 Utah Adv. Rep. at

Based on defendant's failure to object to the voir dire on

the grounds now raised and her passing of the jury for cause,
defendant had failed to preserve the issue for appeal.

Id.

Identical arguments are re-raised in defendant's
petition for rehearing.

But having been previously raised and

litigated, they should not now be considered as appropriate
grounds for rehearing.

Cumminas v. Nielson, 129 P. at 624

(noting that judicial economy is severely diminished when a court
considers reargument of previously litigated issues).

Further,

even if the petition is viewed as a variation of the original
argument, the granting of the petition would be equally
inappropriate in that the law argued by defendant in the petition
was available at the time of the original briefing.

Accord

Tavlor v. Johnson, 581 So.2d at 1338 (M[i]t is well-established
that a reviewing court cannot consider a matter raised by a
movant for rehearing for the first time in the motion for
rehearing"); Hunt v. County of Shasta. 225 Cal.App.3d 432, 275
-8-

Cal.Rptr. 113, 122 n.12 (Cal. App. 1990) ("[i]t is the duty of a
party to see that all points are properly presented in the
original briefs and argument before submission!;] [i]n the
absence of a showing of good cause for the failure to raise the
issue earlier, an appellate court will not consider points newly
urged in a petition for rehearing").
POINT II
THIS COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN CONCLUDING THAT
DEFENDANT HAD FAILED TO PRESERVE FOR APPEAL
THE ISSUE OF THE VOIR DIRE CONCERNING RUBY
KELLY'S RELATIVES.
Even if this Court viewed defendant as raising an
appropriate issue for consideration in her petition for
rehearing, the petition should be denied on the merits.
Defendant predicates her conclusion, that the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require a defendant to timely
object to court-conducted voir dire in criminal cases, on a
comparison of the criminal procedural rules with the civil
procedural rules.

Defendant acknowledges that in either a civil

or criminal trial, the trial court has the discretion to conduct
the voir dire or have counsel conduct it.
18(b); Utah R. Civ. P. 47(a).

Utah R. Crim. P.

However, defendant notes that when

a trial court elects to conduct voir dire, the civil rule states
that the court "shall permit" supplemental requests for questions
while the criminal rule states that the court "may permit"
supplemental inquiries.
rules.)

(See Addendum for complete text of both

From this variation in language, defendant argues that

-9-

Utah law imposes the burden of an adequate voir dire solely on
the trial court in criminal cases which, thereby, alleviates any
obligation for a criminal defendant to timely object to its
adequacy.

Defendant cites no authority for this extraordinary

proposition and indeed cannot, for the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure clearly impose an obligation on defendants to properly
raise objections or face waiver on appeal.
The stated purpose of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure is to "secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in
administration, and the elimination of unnecessary expense and
delay,"

Utah R. Crim. P. 1(b). To this end, rule 20, Utah Rules

of Criminal Procedure, requires a party to "state his objections
to the actions of the court and the reasons therefor," and rule
18(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, specifies that any
challenge to a prospective juror "may be made only before the
jury is sworn to action."

Consequently, if a party fails to so

object, rule 12(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, dictates
that the party will be deemed to have waived any objection to the
issue.
The Utah appellate courts have made clear that in all
trials, whether criminal or civil, a defendant has the obligation
to timely object to the adequacy of the voir dire in a manner
calculated to inform the trial court of the error and to permit
any appropriate correction.

State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83

(Utah 1988) (ruling that to preserve voir dire issues, a
defendant must timely object under rule 18 or face waiver on
-10-

appeal under rule 12); State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 642 (Utah
1988) (under rules 18 and 12, defendant's failure to challenge a
prospective juror or request further inquiry into her alleged
bias constituted waiver which could not be "attributable to the
trial court's failure to do so of its own accord"); State v,
Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) (failure to follow
procedural requirement of lodging challenge before jury is sworn
constituted waiver); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah
1983) (even when the court "forgets" to ask an otherwise proper
voir dire question concerning bias, failure to conform to rule 18
by

"objectfing], remind[ing] the judge of the oversight,

makfing] a new request, [or] ask[ing] permission personally to
voir dire the jury" constituted waiver under rule 12); Doe v,
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458 (failure to ask an otherwise proper voir
dire question constitutes waiver under the general procedural
requirement that "to preserve a question for appeal, an objection
must be clear and concise and made in 'a fashion calculated to
obtain a ruling thereon'"); Brobera v. Hess. 782 P,2d 198, 201
(Utah App. 1989) ("[a] specific objection to the failure to make
a requested voir dire inquiry is required so that the trial court
may correct its error before the jury is selected and empaneled;"
thus, more is required to preserve the issue than merely filing
pretrial written voir dire requests).

See also Keller v. Gerber,

114 Utah 345, 199 P.2d 562, 564-65 (1948) ("whenever a litigant
has a meritorious proposition of law which he is seriously
pressing upon the attention of the trial court, he should raise
-11-

that point in such clear and simple language that the trial court
may not misunderstand it, and if his point is so obscurely hinted
at that the trial court quite excusably may fail to grasp it, it
will avail naught to disturb the judgment on appeal")*
Aside from the clear language of the procedural rules,
the general intent of the criminal rules, to "secure simplicity"
and eliminate "unnecessary expense and delay," can only be
effected by requiring a party to timely object.

See Utah R.

Crim. P. 1(b). Without such a requirement, a defendant could
observe easily correctable omissions by the court in conducting
voir dire, remain silent, and then allege error on appeal.

This

Court has consistently rejected any policy which would encourage
a defendant to invite error in this manner.

State v. Day, 167

Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 10 (Utah App. August 13, 1991); State v.
Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1205-06 (Utah App. 1991).
Contrary to defendant's assertions, this Court's
citation to rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
imposes a general requirement to timely object, and its reliance
on Doe v. Hafen do not result in any different legal standard
than that imposed by rules 18 and 12, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

Instead, rule 20 requires a defendant to timely

object to any claim of error.

Rule 18 is a narrower rule

establishing when an objection to the jury selection process
should be made.

Finally, rule 12 creates waiver as the remedy

for any failure to timely object to pretrial matters.

Further,

the numerous Utah appellate decisions on voir dire consistently
-12-

and freely rely, without distinction, on both civil and criminal
cases.

See Utah cases cited, infra at 10-11.
At the base of defendant's argument that the burden of

an adequate voir dire rests solely with the court, is the
implication that a criminal trial judge must independently
inquire into all grounds which might support a challenge to a
prospective juror.

Such a rigid requirement has never been

required by either the United States or Utah Supreme Courts. For
while a trial court has the responsibility of seating a fair and
impartial jury, "a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its
sound discretion.

This is the rule in civil cases, and the same

rule must be applied in criminal cases.11

Muymin v. Virginia, 111

S. Ct. 1899, 1903-04 (1991) (citations omitted).

Applying this

logic, the Utah Supreme Court has similarly concluded:
[N]o specific form of questioning need be
followed in order for the voir dire to give a
defendant his or her rights due under the
constitution. The constitution does not
require that jurors be questioned
individually, by counsel in the case, or in
any other particular arrangement. The manner
and method of voir dire lies within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
State v. James, Nos. 890309 and 890474, slip op. at 23 (Utah
October 15, 1991).

Accord State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448

(Utah 1988).
Defendant asserts that this Court "has yet to address
the plain error question" (Petition for Rehearing at 4).
However, implicit in this Court's conclusion that defendant had
failed to preserve the issue of the voir dire concerning the
-13-

jurors's knowledge of Ruby Kelly's family, is a rejection of the
invitation by defendant in both her opening and reply briefs to
consider the issue despite any waiver.

Further, the "plain

error" doctrine does not mandate this Court to consider
defendant's argument.
its discretion

Instead, an appellate court may exercise

to correct a trial court error, despite a lack of

objection, where the error is both obvious and harmful.

State v.

Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989).
Here, defendant asked the court to inquire concerning
the prospective jurors' knowledge of Ruby Kelly's relatives (R.
160).

(See Statement of Facts, infra at 3, for specific written

requests.)

While the court did not ask the question in this

specific form, the court did ask if any of the panel were
"familiar" with Ruby Kelly (T. 21). Additionally, at least one
and possibly three of Kelly's relatives were named witnesses
about whom the court questioned the jurors' knowledge.

See

Statement of Facts, infra, at 3). Without, any further direction
from defendant, it was reasonable for the court to assume that it
had covered the scope of defendant's request.

Additionally,

since Utah case law and statutes have never mandated a trial
court to inquiry into any specific areas and have consistently
required any material omissions to be objected to by counsel,
nothing in the existing law would have put the trial court on
notice of any alleged error as now framed by defendant.

Accord

State v. Eldredoe, 773 P.2d at 36.
Nor has defendant even attempted to meet her burden of
-14-

establishing prejudice.

Eldredae, 773 P.2d at 35. Accord State

v. Bishop, 753 P.2d at 448 (even where a voir dire issue has been
preserved, "an appellant has the burden of establishing that
reversible error resulted from an abuse of discretion0).

Here,

there is no allegation that a relative of the victim's sat on the
jury empaneled.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 18(e)(3) (allowing a

challenge for cause to be predicated on "consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be
injured").

Without a showing that one of the jurors who

adjudicated defendant's case could have been removed for cause,
prejudicial error may not be found.

Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S.

Ct. at 1905 (peremptory challenges are not required by the
federal constitution); State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 461
(Utah 1989) (prejudicial error may occur if a party is forced to
"exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror
who should have been removed for cause").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny
defendant's Petition for Rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^ W \ d a y of October, 1991.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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Joan C. Watt and Elizabeth Holbrook, attorneys for appellant,
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, #300, Salt
Lake City, Utah

84111, this cftW->dav of October, 1991.
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ADDENDUM

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 12. Motions.
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion
other than one made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the
court otherwise permits. It shall state with particularity the grounds upon
which it is made and shall set forth the relief sought It may be supported by
affidavit or by evidence.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings on the
admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial
of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial:
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to
charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any
time during the pendency of the proceeding;
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence;
(3) requests for discovery where allowed;
(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule 9; or
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.
(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination.
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall
itate its findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant
relief from such waiver.
(e) Except injustices9 courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including suchfindingsof fact and conclusions
of law as are made orally.
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be
continued for a reasonable and specified time pending the fiifag of a new
indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.

Rule 18. Selection of jury.
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of the jurors that are to
try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for all peremptory
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror
shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the challenges for cause
are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors remaining, and each
side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its peremptory
challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call
the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute
the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list, and the persons whose
names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the
latter event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the
examination by such further inquiiy as it deems proper, or may itself submit
to the prospective jurors additional questions requested by counsel or the
defendant.
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror.
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or
for the trial of a particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection
made to all jurors summoned and may be taken by either party*
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material
departurefromthe procedure prescribed with respect to the selection,
drawing, summoning and return of the panel.
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is
sworn and shall be in writing or recorded by the reporter. It shall
specifically set forth the facts constituting the grounds of the challenge.
(Si) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a
hearing may be had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, and any other persons, may be
celled as witnesses at the hearing thereon.
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(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the
panel is allowed, the court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial
in question is concerned. If a challenge is denied, the court shall
direct the selection of jurors to proceed.
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for
cause. A challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the
jury is sworn to try the action, except the court may, for good cause,
permit it to be made after the juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to challenges
to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall
be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense.
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason
need be given. In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly.
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and may be
taken on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law;
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of
performing the duties of a juror;
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to .the person
alleged to be injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the
prosecution was instituted;
(4) the existence of any social, legal, business,fiduciaryor other relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person
alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that
the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict
which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because he is indebted to or employed by the state or a
political subdivision thereof;
(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil
action, or having complained against or having been accused by him in a
criminal prosecution;
(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment;
(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the
particular offense charged;
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge,
and whose verdict was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the case was submitted to it;
(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act charged as an offense;
(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of
such conscientious opinions about the death penalty as would preclude
the juror from voting to impose the death penalty following conviction
regardless of the facts;
(11) because he is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or
interested in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carry-
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ing on of which is a violation of law, where defendant is charged with a
like offense;
(12) because he has been a witness, either for or against the defendant
on the preliminary examination or before the grand jury;
(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to
whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent himfromacting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly
upon the matter to be submitted to him.
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then
by the defense alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before
peremptory challenges are taken.
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impanelled. Alternate
jurors, in the order in which they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The prosecution and
defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each alternate juror to be chosen.
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, take the same oath and
enjoy the same privileges as regular jurors.
(h) A statutory exemptionfromservice as a juror is a privilege of the person
exempted and is not a ground for challenge for cause.
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in
substance, that they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict according to the evidence
and the instructions of the court

Rule 20. Exceptions unnecessary.
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary. It is sufficient
that a party state his objections to the actions of the court and the reasons
therefor. If a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the
absence of an objection shall not thereafter prejudice him.
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Rule 47. Jurors.
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or
their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper.
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors.
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who,
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the
same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after
the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall
not be used against the alternates.
(c) Challenge defined; by whom made. A challenge is an objection made
to the trial jurors and may be directed (1) to the panel or (2) to an individual
juror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several
parties on either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made.
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A
challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departurefromthe
forms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the
intentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors
drawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be
noted by the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the
ground of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the
jury so far as the trial in question is concerned.
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause.
Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as provided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken
on one or more of the following grounds:
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a
person competent as a juror.
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(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party,
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party.
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward,
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to
either party* or united in business with either party, or being on any bond
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor
and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a
resident thereof indebted to audi municipality by reason of a tax, license
fee, or service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to
such resident.
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then
a witness therein.
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as
a member or citizen of a municipal corporation.
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent himfromacting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journals or
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly
upon the matter to be submitted to him.
Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court The juror challenged,
and any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such
challenge.
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of
jurors that are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow
for all peremptory challenges permitted After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. When
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors
remaining, in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff,
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order in which they appear on the list,
and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury.
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and each of them will well and
truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered
according to the evidence and the instructions of the court.
(i) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the impanelling of the
jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his
duty and there is no alternate juror, the parties may agree to proceed with the
other jurors, or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew. If the
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be
tried with a new jury.

Rule 47

UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Q) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury
to have a view of the property which is the subject of litigation, or of the place
in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to be conducted in a
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them
by some person appointed by the court for that purpose. While the jury are
thus absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them
on any subject connected with the trial.
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished
by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury
they may decide in court or retire for deliberation. If they retire they must be
kept together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they'
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Unless by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must
not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself,
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not,
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may
take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers
which have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions or
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from
the person having them in possession; and they may also take with them
notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves
or any of them, but none taken by any other person.
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause,
they may require the officer to conduct them into court Upon their being
brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of,
or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in
writing or taken down by the reporter.
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew.
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed.
While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in
respect to other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with
the cause submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the
opening of the court, in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment
for the day.
(q) Declaration of verdict When the jury or three-fourths of them, or
such other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to
Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their
names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the
verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the
clerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either
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party may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or
derk asking each juror if it is his verdict If, upon such inquiry or polling
there is an insufficient number ofjurors agreeing therewith, the jury must be
sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be discharged from the cause.
(r) Correction of verdict If the verdict rendered is informal or insuffident, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury
may be sent out again.
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be made of record even if only by appropriate
interlineation of the affidavit.)
INTHE
Finally, perhaps some deference is due to
UTAH
COURT
OF APPEALS
reflect the institutional disadvantage under
which the magistrate operates. The magistrate STATE of Utah,
acts alone in considering warrant applications,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
often under hurried circumstances with
v.
minimal time for reflection or research. By Venus Ann SHERARD,
contrast, appellate judges have the luxury of I
Defendant and Appellant.
group decision-making, more time, and research assistance. See State v. Vigil, 164 Utah No. 9903S3-CA
Adv. Rep. 28, 29 (Utah App. 1991). Perhaps
in a very close case it is appropriate, in reco- FILED: September 10,1991
gnition of this institutional disadvantage, to Third District, Salt Lake County
affirm a probable cause determination that is Honorable David S. Young
found to be technically flawed upon dose
scrutiny, if a magistrate acting in good faith ATTORNEYS:
could nonetheless reasonably have concluded James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, and
there was probable cause.
Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for
While rejecting the articulated basis for the
Appellant
federal courts' willingness to defer, I am open
R.
Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt
to consideration of these other grounds for
Lake City, for Appellee
according deference to the magistrate. But on
the surface, one wonders why a detailed, Before Judges Billings,-Orme, and Russon.
written affidavit should not be Ttvtautd by 5kn
OPINION
appellate court in the same way as other writings not requiring testimony (and thus a RUSSON, Judge:
chance to judge credibility) to understand
Venus Ann Sherard appeals her conviction
what they mean-as posing a question of
law, with no particular deference accorded. See, of criminal homicide, murder in the second
e.g., Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National degree, a first degree felony in violation of
Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988) Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 (1990). We
(issues of contract interpretation not requiring affirm.
consideration of extrinsic evidence are matters
FACTS
of law); Wilbum, 748 P.2d at 584 ('When a
We
review
the
facts
in the light most favocontract is unambiguous, its interpretation is a
I
rable
to
the
jury's
verdict.
State v. Pascual,
question of law.*). Either an affidavit establ804
P.2d
553,554
(Utah
App.
1991).
ishes probable cause or it does not. No crediI
At
approximately
10:00
p.m.
on March 7,
bility issues exist; no evidence has to be
weighed. Why should not the appellate court 1987, Sherard, with Mends, went to a party at
read the affidavit and decide for itself the I Vikki Salazar's home. The party had started
conclusion to be drawn, like it would with a around 7:00 p.m. When Sherard arrived,
about thirty to forty people were present, most
written contract?
For my part, even if no deference was due 1 of whom were drinking.
the magistrate's determination, I would still I A short time after Sherard's arrival, Ruby
vote to affirm. The written affidavit in this I Kelly, the victim in this case, arrived at the
case clearly and unambiguously establishes party with two friends, Kristi Bray and Tanya
probable cause to believe stolen goods would Benns. Sherard did not know Kelly, but did
be found at the nearby place defendant freq- I toow Benns, who was a member of a rival
uented. With or without deference, the prob- | gang. Benns began arguing with Sherard and
able cause determination in this case may be I others, and in response, Salazar asked Kelly
I and her friends to leave. Despite Salazar's
readily sustained.
j protestations, Sherard offered to leave instead.
|
When Sherard reached the front yard of
1. Significantly, the Fourth Amendment does not I Salazar's house, she met one of her friends
speak in terms of what is arguably probable cause whose face was bloody. The friend said that
or what might have seemed at the time to be prob- Kelly had hit her. In response, Sherard said
able cause.
I that she wanted to fight Kelly, and subsequeGregory K. Orme, Judge
( ntly a fight broke out between the two
I women. Kelly had the better of the fight, and
eventually Sherard conceded. As Sherard
I walked away, Benns taunted her to continue
I the fight. According to one witness, Eloy
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Esquibel, before resuming the fight, Sherard
crime of Criminal Homicide asked him for a knife, which he gave her.
Murder in the Second Degree, as
Additionally, at least two witnesses heard
charged in the Information on file
someone shout that Sherard had a knife;
in this case, you must find from all
another testified that he actually saw the knife
of the evidence beyond a reasonable
in Sherard's hand. Sherard testified that
doubt, all of the following elements
Esquibel put 'something" into her hand,
of that offense.
which she did not look at, but believed was a
1. That on or about the 7th day
knife.
of March, 1987, in Salt Lake
Sherard returned, and the fight resumed,
County, State of Utah, the defenmoving into the street. According to several
dant, Venus Ann Sherard, caused
witnesses, Sherard delivered several uppercuts
the death of Ruby Kelly; and
to Kelly's torso. Jeff Salazar, one witness to
2. That said defendant then and
the fight, testified that he saw Sherard uppethere did so: (a) intentionally or
rcut Kelly with the knife in her hand. Todd
knowingly; or (b) intending to cause
Kingston, another witness to the fight, testiserious bodily injury to another, she
fied that after the fight he took a knife from
committed an act clearly dangerous
Sherard and threw it away; several other witto human life; or (c) knowingly
nesses saw him do so. Additionally, Tommy
acting under circumstances evidenQuintana, a friend of Sherard, testified that
cing a depraved indifference to
Sherard told him that she had stabbed Kelly.
human life, she engaged in conduct
Kelly died from nine stab wounds.
which created a grave risk [of]
Sherard was subsequently tried by a jury
death to another;
and convicted of murder in the second degree.
3. Thai, said defendant caused the
Sherard appeals that conviction, raising the
death in an unlawful manner and
following four points: (1) Was there sufficient
without justification.
evidence presented at trial to sustain her conIf you are convinced of the truth
viction for murder in the second degree? (2)
of each and every one of the foreDid the trial court abuse its discretion in limgoing elements beyond a reasonable
iting the voir dire of the prospective jurors?
doubt, then you must find the def(3) Did the trial court properly deny her
endant fpiilty of the offense of
request for a jury instruction on negligent
Criminal Homicide, Murder in the
homicide? (4) Did the trial court commit revSecond Degree as charged in the
ersible error in its instructions to the jury on
Information.
self-defense and mutual combat?
If, on the other hand, you find
that the State has failed to prove
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
any of these elements beyond a
Sherard argues that the evidence presented
reasonable doubt then you must
at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction
find the defendant not guilty.
for murder in the second degree.1 On appeal,
Viewing the evidence and inferences therewe review the evidence and reasonable infer- from in the light most favorable to the jury's
ences therefrom in the light most favorable to verdict, it is sufficiently conclusive to support
the jury's verdict. State v. Harman, 767 P.2d the said verdict. As to the first element, all
567, 568 (Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. witnesses' accounts of the fight support the
Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). We do conclusion that Sherard caused the death of
not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we Kelly. As to the second element, Sherard's
substitute our own judgment on the credibility own testimony that Eloy Esquibel gave her
of the witnesses for that of the jury. State v. something 'heavy and ... real cold and real
Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1&9); see hard like metal or something/ which she
also State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah believed was a knife, and that she punched
App. 1988). On appeal, we will reverse only if Kelly with it numerous times, evidences, at the
the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or very least, a depraved indifference to human
inherently improbable that reasonable minds life. This conclusion is further supported by
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' the testimony of numerous witnesses who
that the defendant committed the crime of recounted Sherard's desire to fight Kelly, Eloy
which she was convicted. State v. Johnson, Esquibel's testimony that Sherard asked him
774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989) (citations for a knife before resuming the fight, and
omitted); see also Pctrcc, 659 P.2d at 444; State various witnesses' accounts of the second
w. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Utah fight, including Jeff Salazar's testimony that
App. 1990). .
he actually saw Sherard uppercut Kelly with a
The jury was instructed on second degree knife in her hand* As to the third element,
murder as follows:
although Sherard testified that she acted in
self-defense, several witnesses testified that
Before you can convict the defendants Venus Ann Sherard, of the
Sherard returned to Kelly and, without justiUTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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fication, resumed the fight. Given the amount
of evidence which supports the State's case,
we cannot *ay that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that
Sherard was guilty of second degree murder,
and therefore conclude that the evidence was
sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
D. VOIR DIRE
Sherard next claims that the trial court erred
in limiting the voir dire of the prospective
jurors. Specifically, she objects to the extent
of the trial court's inquiry as to: (1) the relationship or contact between prospective jurors
and Ruby Kelly's family, (2) group affiliations, (3) experience with and attitude toward
alcohol, (4) experience with and attitude
toward violence, and (5) exposure to publicity.
Voir dire exists to detect bias justifying a
challenge for cause and to assist counsel in the
intelligent use of peremptory challenges. Doe
v. Hafen, 111 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah App.). cert.
granted 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) (citing State
v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844 (Utah 1983)
and Homsby v. Corporation of the Presiding
Bishop, 758 P.2d 929,'932 (Utah App.), cert.
denied sub nom. Homsby v. LDS Church, 773
P.2d 45 (Utah 1988)). The extent of voir dire
is within the discretion of the trial judge, as
long as counsel is given adequate information
with which to evaluate prospective jurors. Id.
• Moreover, 'whether the judge has abused that
discretion is determined, not by considering
isolated questions, but 'considering the totality of the questioning.'9 Id. at 457-58
(quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448
(Utah 1988)).
Sherard's first voir dire issue, concerning
the relationship or contact between prospective
jurors and Ruby Kelly's family, was not
properly preserved for appeal. When asked to
pass the jury for cause, defense counsel objected to the omission of several requested areas
of inquiry, including the other matters raised
on appeal herein. However, defense counsel
did not object to the lack of inquiry into the
relationship or contact between prospective
jurors and Ruby Kelly's family. Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 20 provides that counsel
'state his objections to the actions of the court
and the reasons therefor.* See also Doe v.
Hafen, 772 P.2d at 458. Since defense counsel
failed to do so as to this issue, it was not
properly preserved for appeal.
Sherard's second cbdm of inadequate voir
dire, group affiliations tof the prospective
jurors, also fails. The two requested questions
in this area that were not asked by the trial
court were:
Bo you belong to any dubs or
organizations? Which ones?
What kinds of hobbies and leisure
time activities do you enjoy?
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On appeal, Sherard claims that this area of
inquiry would have revealed whether potential
jurors could relate to the lifestyle of gang
members or find such hfestyle opprobrious.
However, she fails to support this blanket
claim with any argument or analysis as to how
either of the requested questions is probative
of prospective jurors' opinions on the lifestyle
of gang members. Moreover, this was never
given as a reason for requesting these questions below. Since the trial courts have been
instructed not to allow 'inordinately extensive
or unfocused questioning/ id. at 457, we find
no abuse of discretion on behalf of the trial
court in refusing to ask these questions either.
, On the issue of alcohol, the trial court asked
the potential jurors:
There may be evidence during the
course of this case that there were
-alcoholic beverages being consumed
by the defendant, the victim and
maybe others in their surroundings.
Do any of you believe that it is
limply morally wrong to consume
alcoholic beverages in ail cases and
under all circumstances, if so,
would you raise your hand?
There were no affirmative responses to this
question. Sherard claims that this question was
insufficient because it failed to address potential jurors' attitudes toward and experiences
with alcohol. As to the former, we are of the
opinion that this is precisely the sort of question which is designed to elicit potential
jurors' attitudes toward alcohol. As to the
latter, it is the trial court's duty to 'protect
juror privacy/ State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055,
1060 (Utah 1984). To that end, it is the trial
court's duty to forbid defense counsel to
'conduct an inquisition into the private beliefs
and experiences of a venireman.9 Id. On the
facts of this case, it was sufficient for the trial
court to inquire on the attitudes of the potential jurors as to alcohol, without specifically
inquiring as to their experiences with it. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion on
this matter.
Next, Sherard complains as to the inadequacy of investigation into the potential jurors*
experiences with and attitudes toward violence.
With respect to this issue, the trial court asked
four questions: '[HJavc any of you been involved in a fist fight before?'; 'Have any of
you been in a fist fight or in a fight where
weapons liave been used?'; 'JHaveJ any of
you Q been witnesses to a serious injury as a
result of a fight involving weapons ... ?'; and
'Do any of you believe that there is no circumstance or that it is morally wrong to be in a
fight at all situations ... ?' Taken as a whole,
these questions were designed to and did elicit
responses on the prospective jurors' experiences with and attitudes toward violence. Thus,
the trial court's refusal to inquire further was
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included offense must be given when there is
not an abuse of discretion.
The final issue with regard to voir dire is some evidence which supports the theory assSherard's claim that the jurors were not ade- erted by defendant/ State v. Standiford, 769
quately questioned as to their exposure to P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988) (citing State v.
publicity. The judge conducted the following Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 157-59 (Utah 1983)),
there must also be a "rational basis for a
inquiry:
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense
Have any of you heard anything
charged and convicting [her] of the included
about this case, if so, would you
offense."" State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 462
raise your hand? You can say yes or
(Utah 1990) (quoting Baker, 671 P.2d at 159).
no to the question. Have you heard
Thus, we must examine: (1) if there is sufficabout this case?
ient evidence to support Sherard's request for
a negligent homicide instruction, and (2)
All right. Would your familiarity
whether there is a rational basis for a verdict
with the reporting cause you any
acquitting Sherard of murder in the second
reason to believe you could not be
degree and manslaughter, on which the jury
fair and impartial in this case?
was also instructed, but still convicting her of
negligent homicide.
If you read something in the newsNegligent homicide and reckless manslaugpaper would you be caused to
hter are related concepts, both requiring that
believe that this would be true
defendant's conduct be "a gross deviation9
simply because it's in the newspfrom the standard of care exercised by an
aper? pO....
ordinary person/ Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267.
If you heard testimony here in
The only difference is that manslaughter reqconflict with that which you read in
uires that the defendant was actually aware of
the newspaper would you be willing
the risk of death, while in negligent homicide,
to follow that which you believed
the defendant was not, but should have been
from the courtroom that you heard
aware of such risk. Id. (citing Boggess v. State,
in testimony rather than that which
655 P.2d 654, 656-58 (Utah 1982) (Stewart,
you read in the newspaper?
Sherard's objection to exposure to pre-trial J., concurring)).
Our review of the evidence indicates that
publicity concerns the court's failure to ask
about specific magazines which the jurors read Sherard's request for a negligent homicide
or to which they subscribed. However, defense instruction is unsupportable. Sherard's own
counsel presented no argument to connect testimony was that Eloy Esquibel gave her
specific magazines with pre-trial publicity something "heavy and ... real .cold and real
below, nor does counsel present such argu- hard like metal or something/ which she
ment here. It is abundantly clear that the believed was a knife, and that she punched
questions asked, in fact, revealed more about Kelly with it several times. Additionally, after
jurors' familiarity with pre-trial publicity the fight, she told Tommy Quintana, *I
than a vague question about specific magaz- stabbed her, I think I stabbed her.* This tesines subscribed to and read could possibly timony is inconsistent with negligent manslahave elicited. Therefore, again we find no ughter's requirement that the defendant be
unaware of the risks associated with her
abuse of discretion.
In conclusion, the trial court's decision to conduct. In fact, Sherard offers no evidence
limit voir dire did not prevent detection of from which a jury could conclude that she was
(Has, nor did it limit defense counsel's ability unaware of the risks involved. Without such
to intelligently use peremptory challenges. evidence, we cannot justify an instruction on
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in negligent homicide.
Moreover, as noted in Section I above, the
the limitation of voir dire by the trial court in
evidence presented at trial was sufficient to
this case.
convict Sherard of the greater offense, second
HI. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE
degree murder. We, therefore, find that there
Sherard next asserts that the trial court was no rational basis for a verdict acquitting
erred in failing to give her requested jury ins- Sherard of second degree murder and mansltruction on negligent homicide. We review a aughter and convicting her of negligent homtrial court's refusal to give a requested instr- icide.
Lastly, in Standiford, the Utah Supreme
uction under a correction of error standard,
granting no particular deference to the trial Court, on similar facts, held that 'since the
court's ruling. Carpet Barn v. Department of jury convicted of second degree murder
Transp., 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App.), cert. despite the fact that an instruction was given
deniedl95 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citing Ramon on the lesser included offense of manslaugy. Fair, 770 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah hter, failure to give a negligent homicide instruction was, at very best, harmless error/
1989)).
Although *a defendant's requested lesser Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267. Accordingly, we
hold that the trial court did not err in refusing
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Jo instruct the jury on negligent homicide.
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Sherard also contends that the trial court
committed reversible error in instructing the
jury on self-defense and mutual combat.
Specifically, she argues that one of the instructions concerning self-defense erroneously
stated that the test of the reasonableness of
her actions was an objective, not subjective,
test; and that the mutual combat instruction
was irrelevant and confusing.
"[B]eyond the substantive scope, correctness, and clarity of the jury instructions, their
precise wording and specificity is left to the
sound discretion of the trial court. 9 State v.
Aly, 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989)
(citations omitted). However, the said instructions must not incorrectly or misleadingly
state material rules of law. Id.
Sherard argues that Jury Instruction
Number 26 erroneously stated that selfdefense is governed by an objective, not subjective, standard. Instruction Number 26
reads:
The reasonableness of a belief
that a person is justified in using
force that would cause death or
serious bodily injury against
another shall be determined from
the viewpoint x>f a reasonable
person under the then existing circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402(1) {Supp.
1991) provides that, in order to successfully
assert a claim of self-defense, a defendant
must 'reasonably believeQ that such force is
necessary to defend [herself] ... against such
other's imminent use of unlawful force.* We
have previously stated that reasonable in the
context o f section 76-2-402(1) means
'objectively reasonable.* State v. Duran, 772
P.2d 982, 985 (Utah App. 1989) (quoting In re
R./.Z., 736 P.2d 235, 236 (Utah 1987)). This
instruction plainly complies with the objective
standard requirement; therefore, the trial court
did not err in giving the said instruction.
Secondly, Sherard argues that the mutual
combat instruction that was given was irrelevant and confusing. The instruction in question, Jury Instruction Number 18, provides:
If you find that either party was
a party to mutual combat, or other
consensual altercation, and that
during the course of the combat or
altercation, either party used a
deadly weapon, then you must not
consider the consent of the victim in
the encounter as a defense to the
crime of Criminal Homicide.
Almost every account of the fight between
Sherard and Kelly indicates that it was,
indeed, mutual combat. It was therefore ent-

Sherard

CODE^CO

Mv. Rep. SO

P">vo. Ufh

I irely appropriate for the trial court to clarify
by means of instruction that even if Kelly had
I mutually agreed to fight Sherard, this did not
I excuse Sherard'* use of a deadly weapon in
that fight. This is true, even if Kelly is viewed
as the initial aggressor. See State v. Starks,
627 P.2d 88, 90 (Utah 1981) and cases cited
therein. Since the precise wording of jury
instructions is left to the sound discretion of
the trial court, Lopez, 789 P.2d at 45, we hold
that it was proper for the trial court to give
the mutual combat instruction in question.

I
I
I
I

]

CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that: (1) the evidence
presented at trial was sufficient to sustain
Sherard's conviction for murder in the second
degree; (2) The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in limiting the voir dire of the prospective jurors; (3) the trial court properly
denied defendant's request for a jury instruction on negligent homicide; and (4) the trial
court did not err in instructing the jury on selfdefense and mutual combat. Accordingly, we
affirm.
Leonard H. Russon, Judge

1 I CONCUR:
I Judith M. Billings, Judge
I

I CONCUR IN THE RESULT:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
1. Subsequent to the appeal in this case, another
panel of this court clarified our marshaling requirement and applied it to criminal jury trials. State v.
Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990).
Moore held that in order for an appellant's sufficiency of the evidence claim to be reviewed on the
merits, the appellant must marshal the evidence in
support of the jury's verdict and demonstrate that,
even when viewed in the light most favorable to that
verdict, the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict below.
In the case at bar, Sherard has neither marshaled
the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, nor
shown mat, in spite of this evidence, the verdict
below is unsuppoitable. Appellant's brief contains
so references whatsoever to the evidence presented
at trial. In an apparent effort to respond to the
marshaling requirement in Moore, appellant's reply
brief contains a matrix that lists various witnesses
and their testimony on a number of issues.
However, upon examination, this matrix amounts to
no more than an outline of transcript citations. The
reply brief contains no indication as to what evidence supports the jury's verdict or what evidence
opposes it, simply leaving it to us to decipher the
chart. Nor does the reply brief contain any argument as to why the evidence is insufficient to
support the jury's verdict in this case. In other
words, Sherard has plainly failed to present a record
for us to review for sufficiency.
However, since Moore, by its own terms, is meant
to apply only prospectively, id. at 739, and since
this appeal was filed prior to the court's decision in
Moore, we review Sherard's sufficiency of the evidence claim on the merits.
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